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This is indeed a very special gathering;
there are not many industry venues where
both sides of the alternative asset management
family are brought together to talk about
matters in common. Of course, what we are
here to talk about today is how these two
disciplines are moving towards each other
in many different ways - this is the notion
of convergence. While this process is just
getting underway in Asia, it is very far
advanced in the US and Europe, and perhaps
by discussing the trends we've seen you
will have some insight into what may happen
here.
Is this meeting this industry's version
of a summit? Perhaps it's not that serious,
but there are some people, especially in
the private equity community, who have some
pretty strong negative feelings about the
direction hedge funds are going in. The
disagreements in the private fund community
over the roles of hedge fund managers in
non-traditional hedge fund investments reveal
a range of emotions, from concern by the
private equity folks for their futures,
to hostility towards the hedge fund managers
about their new roles.
Speaking about the bid by Highfields Capital
Management to take Circuit City private,
one private equity manager said that "those
guys have no idea of what they're getting
into … Taking a company private is
very different from trading stocks".
The statement, published in a Thompson Financial
article, included very derogatory comments
about hedge fund managers, comments that
I am uncomfortable repeating out loud. Separately,
Henry Kravitz said: "Hedge funds know
how to pick stocks and make lots of money,
but that is not the same thing as creating
value through ownership of an asset over
the long term in a hand's-on way. They lack
the right skills or experience to make a
success of turning around or building private
companies."
Hedge fund managers have said less, but
have not hesitated to call private equity
managers "dinosaurs". David Rubenstein,
one of the Carlyle founders, has agreed.
In fact, Carlyle is starting a fund of hedge
funds and soon after that a long/short hedge
fund. Carl Icahn is also launching a hedge
fund. In addition, they are competing fiercely
for talent. Most hedge funds don't have
the kind of deal experience necessary to
close complex private equity deals and are
paying up to get it. For their part, private
equity professionals who are not at the
partner level of their firms are easily
lured by the chance to share in performance
fees that get paid annually, not just when
there are realisations.
The effect of this process will be to change
how you invest, alter your ability to get
the out-sized returns that your reputations
depend on and how you sell yourselves to
potential investors.
Over the last several years hedge fund managers
and private equity managers were distinct
categories of alternative asset investors.
What they had in common was that they represented
private pools of capital. That was about
it. Their investment styles had virtually
nothing in common: their methods were different,
their investor bases were different and
their cultures were different.
As we all know, things have been changing
on several levels. I am going to run through
these changes quickly, because the depth
and breadth of the changes are pretty profound,
especially when you line them up against
each other:
- Hedge funds have busted into investment
sectors where they haven't been before,
all throughout the capital structure:
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Private equity-style
investments |
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Mezzanine investments |
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Bridge loans and other kinds of
acquisition finance |
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Loans traditionally made by banks |
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Leasing |
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Real estate transactions |
- Market forces have significantly pinched
private equity fund returns, which have
stagnated, on average lagging behind broad
market indices:
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According to a recent McKinsey
report on the private equity industry,
in the late 1990s buyout funds raised
as much as US$50 billion to US$60
billion each year, but were deploying
capital at the rate of US$30 billion
to US$40 billion a year. According
to Thompson Financial, about US$90
billion in the US and €50 billion
are awaiting investment today. |
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The IPO market has dried up, making
exits difficult. In fact, many fund
exits now are sales to other private
equity shops. |
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The overhang of capital in the
market, noted before, is driving
prices up. Participation by hedge
funds in this space exacerbates
this problem. As returns fall, the
ability to raise new funds is impaired. |
- Seeking returns, investors have flocked
to today's hedge funds. Funds of hedge
funds proliferate because investors can't
manage their choices. More capital flows
in and returns narrow further.
Convergence in its different forms
The Fund
In the past, the term "private fund"
addressed legal status, rather than serving
as a useful description of what the entity
did. Is any particular private fund a "hedge
fund", or is it a "private equity
fund"?
- Is liquidity the distinguishing
feature of the two categories? If there
is no liquidity, generally, you would
think the sponsor will not get a performance
fee or carried interest until realisation
of investments. That is the private equity
or committed fund model. In fact, a notable
number of private equity funds are being
required to return all invested
capital before any carried interest is
paid. Traditionally, the rationale for
the sponsor getting an annual fee in the
hedge fund model was that the investor
could flee at any time. (The fact that
the assets traditionally can be priced
with accuracy, unlike in a private equity
fund, allows the fee to be paid
annually, but that is not why
it is paid annually.)
- Hedge funds often have what are called
side pockets, which are illiquid baskets
of investments. The sponsor cannot get
a performance fee on these investments,
and investors cannot redeem any portion
of their interests invested in illiquid
investments, until the side pocket investment
becomes liquid. This is precisely
the notion that has been turned on its
head in the current market.
- The implications of paying annual fees
on locked-up money invested in illiquid
securities are at the heart of the dilemma
facing the private equity business. There
are hedge funds emerging that have multiple-year
lock ups and that pay annual performance
fees. This is remarkable. They are paid
a performance fee despite the fact that
investors can't get their money back and
there is no clawback, generally. Private
equity sponsors cannot get terms this
good. Ever.
- Is the investment strategy
the defining characteristic? Again, not
always. There are private equity funds
that make strategic public investments.
These investments are in liquid securities.
However, since the fund is required to
trade only in contemplation of furthering
the strategy of making investments in
companies that they can control or influence,
and since there is a five-year lock up,
the sponsor gets paid under a traditional
carried interest formula.
The Sponsor
In the industry we have seen for years
private equity firms who wanted to run hedge
fund money. Why? Sometimes they wanted a
place to put the carried interest they earned
in their private equity funds. These boutique
sponsors had so much money that they needed
someone they knew and trusted to invest
their assets. Investment banks had sales
teams and traders in-house, and could increase
assets under management. Need we say more.
Now, this is not the kind of convergence
that has caused tremors in the private funds
industry. This kind of convergence is rather
a reflection of the evolution of the alternative
asset management business. This is asset
gathering and trading on a brand name. Managers
create products to meet perceived needs
of their investors. It is horizontal integration
of related businesses. For hedge fund managers,
it is a little different - they are pursuing
the holy grail of committed, long-term money.
For these managers, the question for the
medium term is whether investors will provide
hedge fund managers with long-term money
if their investment strategy is to make
short-term investments. Eventually, investors
will not agree to long-term lock-ups in
connection with short-term trading strategies.
Let's talk for a while about the main legal
and business considerations convergence
raises for a fund or a sponsor firm:
Managing Conflicts of Interest/Allocation
Decisions
For a manager with multiple funds, there
is a very simple question with no easy answers:
How do you allocate brain power, investment
ideas and investment opportunities between
the funds? Sometimes it isn't that hard,
such as a mezz fund alongside a private
equity fund. But the hedge fund/private
equity fund is the most problematic.
Solutions:
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Clear rules about allocation
(or making it clear that there is complete
investment discretion). |
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Transparency and disclosure have cleansing,
beneficial effects and are very protective
for the investment manager. |
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Wall-off or ring-fence the conflicts.
Some firms have taken this approach.
They treat the businesses as separate,
not looking to gain cross-fertilisation
of investment ideas as much as seeking
to gain efficiencies of scale (that
is, using the platform) and trading
on the firm's brand name, as discussed
before. As an example of this, Blackstone
created a fund of hedge funds family,
rather than hedge funds, as such, because
they didn't want the conflict of interests.
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Valuations
The implication of valuation concerns center
on the fact that hedge funds receive their
performance fees annually. (Separately,
I note that we are seeing more funds, especially
funds of hedge funds, have semi-annual or
quarterly performance allocations or fees.
The rationale for this practice is uncertain,
or even dubious, in my opinion.)
- In a hedge fund portfolio, how do you
mark-to-market illiquid investments? There
are benchmark methodologies, such as the
British Venture Capital Association rules,
but the goal there is to create a transparent
practice that is consistent through an
industry; it does not mean that the established
values represent market value.
- Then there is the question of how purchasing
and redeeming investors are being treated.
The portfolio valuation determines whether
long-term investors are getting diluted
when new investors come in or new investors
are paying too much, setting up a conflict
of interest that involves the relative
position of the investors.
Hedge funds taking performance fees or
allocations on long-term positions or
private equity-style investments with
perhaps questionable valuations should
be known as the Clinton Doctrine: they
do it because they can. Why do they seek
and receive unrestricted investment mandates:
because they can. When will it end? When
they get caught - when one fund blows
or busts a big deal, when a fund can't
meet redemptions because of illiquid positions,
when it becomes clear that not every hedge
fund manager should be making private
equity-style investments without the right
talent, experience or infrastructure.
One way to deal with these issues is what
I call The Blum Approach - one of the
first private equity funds with a public
investment basket was a firm in San Francisco
headed by Richard C. Blum. The approach
Blum took is consistent with traditional
alternative asset principles: despite
the fact that the fund could make investments
in traded securities, no performance allocation
was made until there was a realisation.
These investments were expected to be
long-term in nature and involve increasing
value through influencing management of
the portfolio company. This approach is
in stark contrast to current practice
in today's hedge fund market.
So, what are private equity funds to do?
- Improve the quality and depth of
due diligence
This will distinguish you from many of
the hedge fund managers in the market.
This statement doesn't go to the quality
of hedge fund managers or their ability
to be thorough; it goes to their experience
of private equity professionals and the
different things they may look for. This
plays to the strength of private equity
funds.
- Keep your fund size down
In a trend that is in full swing in the
US - and some smart people in Hong Kong
told me that this is happening here -
private equity firms are not swinging
for the fences on fund raising. They want
a fund size that can be deployed within
the commitment period without over-paying
for deals, stretching for big deals or
over-extending the firm. Smaller deals
are relationship based, giving the fund
the opportunity for proprietary deals.
- Be hands-on
These smaller firms take a hands-on approach
to the management of portfolio companies,
teaming up with operational professionals,
former CEOs, CFOs and other senior executives
of Fortune 1000 companies to take on diligence
roles or even management or consulting
roles with portfolio companies. One of
our clients will not do a deal unless
one of the "operating partners"
takes a leading role in the target.
- Raise targeted funds
Stay within your bailiwick and emphasise
specialty. With specialisation, it is
easier to argue that you have more proprietary
deals and a deeper network to feed deal-flow
and ideas.
One of the key linking features of the
items I just mentioned: Network, network,
network.
So, what are hedge funds to do?
- In part, keep doing what you are doing.
- Think long term about what you want
to be to your investors. Listen to them
and their concerns, and understand your
limits.
- Bring in the private equity professionals
needed to make you a leader in those deals,
rather than someone that can be criticised,
rightly or wrongly, as someone playing
beyond their depth.
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