Hachiman Japan Fund is a Japan long/short
equity fund that is run by Toru Ueda
and Yashwant Bajaj in Tokyo. Toru,
CIO, has 16 years' buy-side experience
overseeing US$2 billion at Mercury
(as head of institutional funds and
research) from 1987 to 1997 and US$5
billion at PPM Japan from 1998 to
2001. Yashwant, CFO, has 19 years'
Japanese equities sell-side experience
and also has experience in equities,
CB, listed and unlisted derivatives,
having worked with Nikko Securities,
Kleinwort Benson, Dresdner Kleinwort
Benson and Lehman Brothers.
The fund was launched in January 2005
and currently has US$4 million under
management.
- Can you briefly explain the
organisational structure of the
firm and what each of your role
is?
Toru and I are 50:50 partners of
the firm. Toru is the overall portfolio
manager with decision rights on
stock inclusion and exclusion, I
am the risk manager with risk management
override rights and CAO. We both
conduct analysis on our "core universe"
and "shadow universe" of companies.
The third member of our team, Jason
Jones, is based in Singapore and
conducts trading, daily administration
for the fund and is the office manager
for Hachiman Capital Management
Singapore
- How long have the two investment
principals known each other and
why did you want to launch a hedge
fund, and why as partners?
Toru and I have known each other
for ten years, starting with a relationship
when I was head of sales at Kleinwort
Benson and his institutional salesman
when he was head of the fund management
team at Mercury Tokyo. We have been
involved with each other on a professional
and personal level since then. When
I was looking to set up a hedge
fund last summer, Toru was at the
top of my list of senior market
professionals with business set
up experience and an entrepreneurial
nature.
- Can you briefly explain your
investment approach?
We focus primarily on a universe
of $1-8 billion market-capitalisation
companies. Within this we conduct
bottom-up research on a proprietary
"core" and "shadow" universe of
companies. Without going into details
here, our philosophy is to focus
on companies with demonstrable,
clear business drivers where these
can be correlated with historical
share price performance. As such,
for example, we would not look at
diversified companies or sectors
where there is little share price
correlation with the companies underlying
business performance.
Our investment process looks for
anomalies in a range of valuation
criteria, focusing on the most relevant
for a particular company or industry.
When we find these we test these
against market consensus, empirical
data and finally company management
feedback. From there a collective
decision is made to either include
or exclude a position and a target
valuation and share price is set.
A rolling 6-month research review
process is conducted on all covered
companies.
- Are there any sectors which
you will not cover?
As described above, we will not
cover diversified companies and
sectors with little correlation
of share price with business drivers,
eg, IDMs, utility companies.
- Regarding shorts, it appears
that companies in Japan can have
flawed business models and tarnished
brands but still rise 10-15% in
one day on rumours of foreign buyouts.
How do you protect your short book
on, say, short borrowing Daiei days
before someone whispers that Wal-Mart
will buy it?
We would typically not be involved
in cases like the one you have mentioned
- takeover or restructuring potential
valuations are actually strongly
reflected in our current long book.
More likely you will find companies
where consensus valuations are dramatically
different from our proprietary research
or the business model is misunderstood
or failing in our opinion, against
consensus views to the contrary.
- How actively can one short
borrow in the Japanese mid-cap (US$500m
- US$1bn) space? Will the fund's
short book be focused on more large
caps (>US$1bn); and since those
names are so well covered by the
Street, where is the edge?
We have tested liquidity constraints
on our universe with historical
liquidity screens and believe that
the portfolio is scalable without
altering our set out number of positions
(typical median is 25 long, 25-30
short) up to US$300 million. With
an increase to approximately 120
overall positions, we believe it
is scalable to US$700 million capacity.
The long AND short books will focus
at US$1-8 billion companies. We
are acutely aware of potential beta
and other risk mis-matches between
long and short books by having a
short book constituted with significantly
different market cap to our long
book. The median market cap of the
short book companies is US$3.5 billion
larger than that of the long book.
- With the success of funds like
Tower and Arcus, many new hedge
funds focusing on the mid- to small-cap
space have started over the past
12 months. Is there concern that
this space is getting crowded?
The current funds tend to have,
in our opinion, generally a mid-cap
universe which is smaller market
cap than ours - we would describe
this area as small cap, particularly
on the long book. Also our universe
of company coverage without giving
any numbers away here, is smaller
and more concentrated. Finally,
throwing modesty aside, our experience
base is a significant edge.
- What is the strategic reasoning
for having between 20-40% of the
portfolio in pair trades? Will these
be model-driven pair trades?
The pairs are fundamentally driven
and are loosely defined - supply
chain pairs, sector competitors
are two examples. The pairs are
not delta neutral and typically
have significant size and return
differences on either side, ie,
they are net directional in view.
- Do you envision that you will
have a portion of the portfolio
that you will trade aggressively,
or are the plans to be more long-term
investors?
There is no set rule other than
opportunity cost driven by annualised
return of the positions. We typically,
however, would look for positions
with a 6-12 month return profile
to target valuation. We participate
in IPOs and POs when these concur
with our fundamental views.
- Can you explain the fund's
risk management policy - where you
view the risks are in running a
Japan L/S fund focused on mid caps;
what are the risk guidelines; how
are they monitored (ie Beachamp)
and how are they enforced (by Jason
Jones in Singapore)?
We operate hard individual position
stops and portfolio stops that reduce
gross exposure. I tend to monitor
volatility changes on individual
stock positions, particularly on
the short book where "step" changes
occur. These typically would trigger
risk reduction of the position independent
of our hard stops. Typical examples
of this occurring are when retail
activity builds dramatically in
a stock, skewing performance away
from fundamentals beyond our normal
portfolio management controls. I
also use our prime broker VaR and
other risk analytic tools for risk
management.
- What are your current market
views, especially with the steep
sell-off of growth small/mid caps
since the summer?
We are generally positive on our
space and having been running a
30-40% net long bias.
Contact Details
Yashwant Bajaj
TY Advisers
+ 81 3 5456 5143
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